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Of Labor Law and Dissonance
JAMES J. BRUDNEY"
What accounts for the dissonance between the meaning of our
national labor law, as decreed primarily by federal judges,' and the
social and economic realities of workplace relationships addressed by
that law? In his darkly eloquent commentary, Professor Getman
acknowledges that such dissonance is not unique to the law governing
labor-management relations. Yet the courts' often mistrustful approach
toward employee rights under the National Labor Relations Act
( NLRA" or "Act") 2 has had a special impact. The NLRA emerged at
a time of social turbulence, and was based on a recognized need to
redress the fundamental inequality of bargaining power between labor
and management. While other factors help explain the persistence of
the inequality six decades later, decisions of the federal judiciary
figure prominently in the story.
Professor Getman makes arresting use of the analogy between the
British army's rules of military engagement in World War I and the
rules of legal engagement applied in federal labor law. One of his
central contentions is that elites in each setting developed rules "to
control the conduct of people whose situation they did not understand
and whose experiences they did not share."3  I will explore two
questions that this contention raises for me. First, how should we
understand the role played in recent decades by an institutional elite
* Associate Professor, The Ohio State Universlhy College of Lai. I recehed valuable
comments and suggestions from ictor Brudney, Deborah Merriltt, and Sara SchlavonL Amy
Bryan provided excellent research assistance, and Michele Newlton abv Otped the manuscrlpL
1. Professor Getman's critique encompasses the National Labor Relations Board, arbitrators,
and academic commentators, as well as judges. See Julius Getman, Of Labor Law and
Birdsong, 30 CONN. L. REv. 1345, 1349-51 (1998). His principal focus, how-ever,
understandably rests with the federal courts; the Supreme Court and the courts or appeals are
responsible for resolving major controversies under, and assigning meaning to, the provisions
of the National Labor Relations AcL
2. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). I use "NLRA" to refer
to the 1935 statute as amended in 1947, 1959. and at other later dates.
3. Getman, supra note 1, at 1348.
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presumptively more responsive to social and economic realities-the
politically accountable legislative branch? Over the past 25 years,
Congress has declined to adjust the meaning of the NLRA despite
intense and repeated efforts by the union movement to alter judicial
precedent. To what extent is it appropriate to infer that court
decisions interpreting the Act have achieved something akin to
democratic legitimacy? Second, how are we to explain federal judges'
inhospitable attitude toward workers' rights under the NLRA?
Professor Getman refers to class bias, which begets lack of
understanding, as a major contributor. Drawing on some of my own
empirical data, I offer preliminary thoughts on the extent to which
class background and other personal characteristics may influence
judicial decisonmaking on labor issues.
I. INSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION AND DISSONANCE
Professor Getman's critique focuses on the courts rather than the
legislature: not on the statute as enacted and modified buton the web
of decisions and doctrines limiting the promise of the NLIA.4 I share
Professor Getman's premise that the Act set forth significant
redistributive goals and conferred substantial rights on employees in an
effort to encourage achievement of those goals. Even after the Taft-
Hartley Amendments,5  the basic protections given to labor-to
organize, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted
action-remained in place, largely undisturbed.
To be sure, some of the Act's language is vague or open-ended
enough to invite a wide range of interpretations.' Inconclusive text,
4. Other scholars have maintained that the legal order established by the Act itself
contributed substantially to a less combative and ultimately more shackled labor movement.
See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (contending that Supreme
Court's early pro-labor interpretations of the Wagner Act curtailed rank and file Initiatives
while institutionalizing union interests); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm
in American Labor Law, 90 YALE. LJ. 1509, 1565 (1981) (contending that arbitration
undermines the power of workers).
5. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994). The addition
of a right to refrain from participating in pro-union activity, and the creation of union unfair
labor practices, offset to some extent the rights associated with self-organization.
6. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (defining collective bargaining as "the mutual obligation
...to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment. . . . but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession"); 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(authorizing Board in its remedial capacity to take "such affirmative action . . . as will
[Vol. 30:1353
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however, need not trigger judicial results that diminish employee and
union rights. Since 1970, Supreme Court decisions construing the
NLRA have become distinctly less favorable toward workers'
concerted activity, both in aggregate terms and in important "statute-
defining" cases.' The Supreme Court's conservative signals may also
have reduced the ability of the courts of appeals to promote or
endorse pro-labor interpretive outcomes, to the extent they would be
interested in doing so.
Yet in the realm of statutory meaning, a misguided judiciary does
not have the final word. Congress is capable of correcting mistakes,
of refocusing the statutory enterprise, of renewing the earlier
commitment to protect and encourage workers' collective action.
Congress has not done so. In a few early instances, notably the
permanent replacement doctrine announced in NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Telegraph Co.,' Congress may even have incorporated the Court's
conclusion into statutory text.' More recently, Congress has not
revisited the NLRA at all. The labor movement since the 1970s has
twice lobbied hard for legislative change. Each effort at reform
occurred in political circumstances that made success seem attainable.
Neither effort resulted in a legislative enactment.
The application of statutes to shape public policy involves ongoing
dialogue and collaboration between the legislative and judicial
branches."0 Perhaps prolonged legislative silence with regard to an
entire regulatory scheme invites courts to conclude that they should
continue on their chosen path. In the NLRA context, judicial
weakening of the statutory commitment to group action may simply
accord with modem democratic preferences. Congress, of course,
could be criticized for ignoring labor relations realities in the legal
rules it tolerates and implicitly approves. But are we then to
effectuate the policies of this subchapter").
7. See James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Lin of the Workplace, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1572-80 (1996) (discussing sharp decline in Supreme Court's willingness
to sustain Board findings of section 8(a) liability after 1970. and analyzing several key
Supreme Court decisions that limited employee rights).
8. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
9. See Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L No. 80-101, § 9(c)(3), 61 Stat.
136, 144; Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L No. 86-257, § 702,
73 Stat. 519, 542 (first adding and then modifying 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3), which appears to
recognize that economic strikers in some circumstances are not entitled to reinstatement).
10. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Cour, 1993
Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L REv. 26, 56-71 (1994); Daniel A.
Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. LJ. 281, 306-14 (1989).
19981
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conclude-somewhat awkwardly-that contemporary legislators
misunderstand and are biased against the needs and interests of their
own working class constituents?
This question provokes a mixed response. The decades-long
decline in union density has resulted in less vocal and persistent
advocacy for collective bargaining rights in Congress. The flow of
campaign funds from the business community has far exceeded
spending by unions, further weakening organized labor's voice. For
several reasons, however, the diminished political clout of the union
movement should not absolve federal courts of their responsibility for
eroding NLRA values and priorities.
First, to suggest that contemporary legislators' wariness or
ignorance of NLRA protections can legitimate court decisions assumes
an inverted set of temporal priorities. Courts are charged with
applying statutory text based on what the originating Congress did
rather than what later Congresses have failed to do. That charge is
especially exacting when the originating Congress has overcome
powerful opposition to effect fundamental change in the status quo. In
enacting the NLRA, Congress imposed a comprehensive regulatory
structure that transformed the prior judicially created mix of rights and
duties governing labor-management relations. While judicial tinkering
with the new structure was inevitable and even desirable, courts'
legitimate role is to sustain or enhance-not diminish or reshape-that
structure. Only the emergence of a new legislative consensus can
justify weakening or jeopardizing the rights and protections embedded
in the regulatory scheme.
Moreover, at a minimum it overstates the meaning of legislative
inaction to impute to recent Congresses an indifferent or tolerant
mindset toward the diminution of NLRA rights. The complex
demands of modem national government require Congress to maximize
its use of finite resources-particularly the time and political capital of
its members. Any commitment Congress makes to respond to judicial
interpretations of older statutes means less time and fewer political
resources are available for an already crowded legislative agenda. The
Supreme Court has become less interested in NLRA cases over recent
decades," and court of appeals decisions are unlikely to be noticed
even by congressional committees that would have jurisdiction to
11. See James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the
Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 960-65 (1996) (documenting Supreme Court's
declining attention to the NLRA).
[Vol. 30:1353
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address them. 2 Accordingly, many cases that are hotly debated within
the labor-management community do not achieve legislative
recognition, much less become agenda priorities.
Congress's resource constraints are reinforced by certain patterns of
legislator behavior. Members tend to perceive more tangible political
and policy-related benefits from responding to social concerns
previously unaddressed in federal law than from refining extant
regulatory programs. This perception may be strengthened with regard
to an existing statutory regime such as the NLRA that has powerful
and well-organized interest groups on both sides of every potential
reform issue. Members sympathetic to promoting greater equality or
fairness in the workplace can channel their efforts toward other
statutory initiatives. In recent decades, organized labor has enjoyed
considerable success championing new approaches to various
unregulated workplace problems, 3 notwithstanding its inability to
secure legislative changes in the NLRA.
Apart from limited congressional resources and the challenges
associated with revisiting older statutes, there has in fact been
demonstrated majority support for pro-worker reform of the NLRA.
That support, however, has fallen victim to the supermajority demands
imposed under modem Senate practice. Since the early 1970s, the
filibuster has become a major technique for thwarting approval by
coalesced majorities on a wide range of public policy matters. 4 A
number of factors have contributed to this dramatic change. The
expanded congressional workload imposes greater time constraints on
the chamber as a whole while creating more opportunities to engage in
obstructive tactics. The adoption of a two-track system for handling
12. See Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Betismen Courts and Congrem: A
Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. LJ. 653, 662 (1992) (reporting that most
lower court decisions are not noticed by committee leaders or their staffs).
'13. Examples of such new approaches include the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act of 1988, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
14. In the 40 years preceding 1970, the Senate filibuster was used almost exclusively by
Southern Democrats and their allies to block civil rights legislation. See SARAH A. BINDER &
STEVEN S. SMITH, POLrTCS OR PRINCIPLE?: FILIBUSTERING IN "THE UNITED STATES SENATE I1
(1997); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fitbuster, 49 STAN. L REv. 181, 199-200
(1997). Filibuster use has surged and diversified in the past 25 years. See BINDER &
SMrrH, supra, at 9 (reporting that Senate conducted 284 cloture votes between 1975 and 1994,
as contrasted with 103 votes in the 58 years preceding 1975); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra, at
201-03 (reporting that number of cloture votes has increased steadily in each decade since
1960s, and that Senators now filibuster on a range of domestic and foreign policy issues).
1998]
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Senate debate allows for efficient management of floor business but at
a cost of making the filibuster more tolerable to the majority and less
onerous for the obstructors. 5 As a result of party realignment and
more polarized partisan conflict, it has become easier to mount and
sustain a party-backed filibuster. Whatever the relative weight of these
and other causal factors, there have been many occasions over the past
two decades when a majority of Senators favored cutting off debate
but were unable to secure the 60 votes needed to invoke cloture and
enact the legislation at issue. 6
A number of these instances involved efforts to reform the NLRA.
In 1977-78, the House comfortably approved a bill that would have
addressed widely shared concerns about inadequate protections for
employee organizing and collective bargaining by requiring expedited
union election procedures and stronger remedies for unfair labor
practices.' 7  A Senate majority twice fell several votes short of
invoking cloture. 8 In 1991-92 and again in 1993-94, the House by a
considerable margin passed a bill that responded to the recently
expanded reliance on permanent replacement workers by overriding the
Mackay Radio decision and banning the permanent replacement of
economic strikers. 9 On each occasion, a Senate majority was unable
to invoke cloture.2" While these legislative reform measures would not
have alleviated the full extent of perceived judicial insensitivity toward
15. See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 14, at 13-16 (discussing these and other reasons for
expanded use of filibuster); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 201-05 (explaining rise of
the "stealth" filibuster, and contending that a major cause was Senate leadership's decision to
allow other floor business to move forward while cloture proceedings are pursued
simultaneously on a separate track).
16. See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 14, at 9 (reporting 46 occasions between 1975 and
1994 in which the coalition voting for cloture was more than a majority but less than a
supermajority, and cloture failed).
17. See 123 CONG. REc. 32,613 (1977) (House approves comprehensive labor law reform
bill by 257-163).
18. See 124 CONG. REc. 17,749 (1978) (Senate cloture vote on June 15 fails, 58-39; three
absent Senators would have voted no); 124 CONG. REC. 18,398 (1978) (Senate cloture vote on
June 22 fails, 53-45). President Carter supported the bill and was prepared to sign it into
law.
19. See 137 CONG. REC. H5589 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (House approves bill to ban
permanent replacements by 247-182); 139 CONG. REC. H3568 (daily ed. June 15, 1993)
(House approves bill to ban permanent replacements by 239-190).
20. See 138 CONG. REC. S8237-38 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (Senate cloture vote fails 57-
42; one absent Senator would have voted no); 140 CONG. REC. S8524 (daily ed. July 12,
1994) (Senate cloture vote fails 53-47); 140 CONG. REc. S8844 (daily ed. July 13, 1994)
(Senate cloture vote fails 53-46). President Bush opposed the bill in 1992, but President
Clinton supported it in 1994 and was ready to sign it into law.
[V/ol. 30:1353
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employee rights under the NLRA, each would have made the operation
of legal rules more congruent with the socio-economic realities of the
workplace.
There is nothing illegitimate about a determined minority using
Senate procedures to frustrate the will of a reform-minded majority.
Still, the failure of these reform efforts underlines the difficulty of
correcting judicially imposed meaning in the congressional arena.
Commentators or judges who rely on extended legislative silence and
the inability to muster a supermajority as grounds for inferring support
or approval from Congress can do so only by ignoring the realities of
the modem legislative process. The primary focus for our inquiry into
the dissonance highlighted by Professor Getman should remain with
the federal courts.
II. JUDICIAL ATITUDES AND DISSONANCE
There is some evidence to support the assertion that in the
aggregate, federal courts of appeals have been steadily and unusually
hostile to the statutory rights asserted by workers and their unions.
An early study found that between 1936 and 1954, the NLRB had less
success than other administrative agencies in having its orders fully
enforced by the courts of appeals.2 The same study concluded that
appellate courts were far more likely to enforce Board unfair labor
practice findings against unions than similar agency findings against
employers.' More recently, a study of judicial review covering
diverse federal agencies found that the NLRB has a lower affirmance
rate in the courts of appeals than other agencies that also act almost
exclusively through adjudication and have a similarly high volume of cases?
21. See RONDAL GENE DOWuNG, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND LABOR RELATiONs POuCY,
1936-1954: A STDY OF JUDICIAL DECIsIoN-MAmIG 137-38 (1956) (Ph.D. disertaflon,
University of Illinois (Urbana)) (reporting that NLRB orders were fully enforced in 63.3% of
all unfair labor practice cases reviewed between 1936 and 1954, compared with full judicial
enforcement for 80% of orders issued by Securities and Exchange Commission, 70% of orders
issued by Federal Trade Commission, and 66% of orders issued by Federal Power
Commission; but cautioning against conclusive generalizations in light of lower caseload
volume for the three latter agencies).
22. See id at 138-39 (reporting that 86.5% of Board orders finding liability against unions
under section 8(b) were sustained, while only 62.4% of Board orders finding liability against
employers under section 8(a) were sustained during same period).
23. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study
of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE LJ. 984, 1013-22 (1990) (reporting that in 1984-
85, courts of appeals affirmed in full 75% of NLRB orders, 83% of orders issued by
19981
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It would be difficult to evaluate the Labor Board's success rate in
the Supreme Court relative to other agencies, given the discretionary
nature of certiorari jurisdiction. One can, however, observe the
Court's differential treatment of unions and corporations when
reviewing certain comparable aspects of their relationship to their own
constitutive membership and also of their respective efforts to
influence the general public. Thus, the Court has concluded that
corporations may compel their shareholders to subsidize management
positions on policy issues even when those issues are unrelated to the
furtherance of the corporate enterprise.24  By contrast, labor
organizations are barred from requiring their bargaining unit members
to underwrite union positions on policy or legislative matters that bear
a substantial relationship to employee welfare, including such matters
as organizing new members and lobbying the legislature to require
better wages or working conditions.'
In a similar vein, a union's secondary consumer picketing tailored
to a struck product and a utility company's pro-usage policy statement
inserted in a monthly billing are each forms of protected expression.
The former encourages consumers to avoid doing business with a
certain company; the latter encourages consumers to do more business
with a certain company. The Supreme Court on the same day held
that government could ban the union's expression as unlawful26 but
that the corporation's expression was constitutionally protected against
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and 90% of orders issued by Merit Systems Protection
Board). In a slightly later period, 1986-93, appellate courts fully enforced Board unfair labor
practice findings against unions more often than against employers, though the difference was
not statistically significant. See Brudney, supra note Ii, at 976-78 (reporting 85.5%
enforcement rate for union unfair labor practices and 80.3% enforcement rate for employer
unfair labor practices). During this seven year period, employer unfair labor practice cases In
the courts of appeals outnumbered union unfair labor practice cases by a ratio of nine to one.
See id. at 973.
24. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding that
government may not prohibit corporate management from spending corporate funds on policy
matters unrelated to the economic life of the corporation).
25. See Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (holding that union may
expend agency fees over feepayer objection only for matters directly related to the collective
bargaining process); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984)
(holding that union expenditures for organizing new members outside the bargaining unit are
not sufficiently related to the collective bargaining process); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,
500 U.S. 507 (1991) (holding that union expenditures for lobbying to improve working
conditions are not sufficiently related to the collective bargaining process).
26. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
1360 [Vol. 30:1353
HeinOnline  -- 30 Conn. L. Rev. 1360 1997-1998
OF LABOR LAW AND DISSONANCE
government regulation."
The Court, to be sure, offered neutral, doctrine-based explanations
for the differential results in these cases, although several Justices
expressed concern over what they regarded as inconsistent reasoning."
Professor Getman has proposed a different explanation, pointing to the
ideological attitudes and biographical attributes of the judges
themselves. In effect, he suggests that judges, who "have been
through the transformative experiences of law school, judicial clerking,
and high level legal practice," 9 have ignored or eroded the potential
of the NLRA at least partly because they understand and sympathize
with the lives and hopes of corporate executives more than the lives
and hopes of workers.
This is a substantial concern, and Professor Getman is not alone in
raising it. Indeed, his commentary places him in the middle of a
lively debate among social scientists who study judicial
decisionmaking. Empirical research into judicial behavior recognizes
that case-specific fact situations and legal precedent play a major role,
but posits that judges' personal attributes, educational background, and
pre-judicial experience also help explain court decisions3 There is
disagreement over the relative explanatory value of judicial attitudes as
shaped by political party identification, religion, status of college
attended, and other background variables.' In addition, social
27. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Scrv. Comm'n. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
28. See Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring in result);
Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 552-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bellottl, 435 U.S. at
812-21 (White J., dissenting).
29. Getman, supra note 1, at 1349.
30. See, e.g., C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in
Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior. 1916-1988, 35 Am. J. POL Sci.
460 (1991); Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges' Attributes and Case Characteristics: An
Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Dectsionmaking, 71 JUMD!CATURE 277
(1988). Personal attributes may include factors such as race, gender, religion, and year of
birth. Educational background may include the status and geographic region of the college
and law school from which the judge graduated, and also the years of graduation. Pre-
judicial experience covers such factors as whether an individual held elective office or a state
court judgeship prior to becoming a federal judge, and the political party of the President who
appointed the individual to the federal bench.
31. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the US. Courts of Appeals Revisited
69 AM. POL. Sct. REv. 491, 503-05 (1975) (describing study of split decisions in courts of
appeals over seven year period, and reporting that Democrats, Catholics, and younger judges
tended to be more liberal on economic issues although correlations between background
variables and liberal or conservative issue positions were generally weak, with notable
exception for NLRA issues); C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics D.cislons, 1946-
19981
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scientists have struggled to quantify the importance of various familial,
educational, professional, and political experiences.3 2 Yet as Professor
Getman's critique suggests, the consequences for explaining judicial
behavior in this area justify further investigation.
Professor Getman's assertion that class bias and lack of
understanding are major contributors to judicial resistance in the
NLRA setting could spark numerous inquiries. For instance, in
studying over 1200 recent court of appeals decisions that reviewed
NLRB unfair labor practice ("ULP") adjudications, I found that the
courts reversed Board determinations of bargaining-related employer
misconduct under section 8(a)(5) at a rate significantly higher than
they reversed Board determinations of employer misconduct against
individual employees under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).33 One factor
that might help account for the differential is lack of judicial
sympathy, if one posits that unions and group action among workers
are a special object of class-related judicial hostility. The differential
also might be explained by pointing to lack of judicial familiarity:
unlike unlawful threats under section 8(a)(1) or discriminatory
discharges under section 8(a)(3), both of which are comparable to
prohibited conduct in other areas of public law, bargaining-related
misconduct has no obvious parallels in public law outside the NLRA.34
Determining which judicial background variables are significantly
associated with more frequent votes to overturn section 8(a)(5) liability
may shed light on the relative importance of these two explanatory
factors, and may also help us understand whether the two can be
meaningfully separated.
In broader terms, preliminary analyses of my data base show that
1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1981) (challenging the prevailing view that judges'
background characteristics cannot satisfactorily help explain their judicial behavior). See gener-
ally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997) (critically examining
quantitative and qualitative research approaches to judicial decisionmaking).
32. See AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 374
(Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 1978) (arguing that judicial background and attribute
variables do not necessarily represent identical experiences, and therefore are not readily linked
to a single set of attitudes or values); S. Sidney Ulmer, Are Social Background Models Time-
Bound?, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 957 (1980) (suggesting that social background variables may
have substantially different explanatory value with respect to distinct eras or time periods of a
court's operation).
33. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 982. The use of "significantly" refers to results that
are statistically significant, meaning it is very unlikely (less than a 5% possibility) that the
different reversal rates are the result of random error in sampling or coding. See Id. at 972
n.100 (explaining statistical significance).
34. See id at 982-83.
[Vol. 30:1353
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judicial votes to reject the union's position on issues of ULP liability
or relief5 were closely related to certain background variables.
Bivariate comparisons indicate that judges were significantly more
likely to reject the union's position if they were male, had graduated
from a more elite college, had not held elected office, and had been
appointed by a Republican President. 6  A preliminary multiple
regression analysis suggests that the more ideological factor-party of
the appointing President-loses significance when controlling for the
effect of other variables, but that gender, college background, and
elected office experience remain significant."' Female judges, those
who graduated from less prestigious colleges, and those who held
elective office, were significantly more likely to support the union's
position in the courts of appeals. The results are only tentative and
further analysis is needed. Still, if the findings hold up they may
35. Some 95% of Board results reviewed in the 1200 appellate court cases fall into one of
three issue categories: employer liability under section 8(a); union liability under section 8(b);
and relief against the employer under section 10(c). On a section 8(o) issue, a rejection of
the union's position is a vote to reverse the Board determination of employer liability or a
vote to affirm the Board determination of no employer liability. On a section 8(b) issue, a
rejection of the union's position is a vote to affirm the Board determination of union liability
or a vote to reverse the Board determination of no union liability. On a section 10(c) issue,
a rejection of the union's position is a vote to reverse the Board grant of broad relief against
the employer or a vote to affirm the Board grant of narrow or no relief against the employer.
36. Bivariate comparisons use statistical techniques to examine the relationship between two
variables without controlling for other variables that might affect that relationship. In this
instance, the comparisons are between the dependent variable, judge's vote (agree with union
or reject union), and independent variables such as gender and political party of appointing
President See generally JANET BuTrrouH JoHNSoN & RICHARD A. JOSLYN, POLmncAL
ScIENCE RESEARCH METHODS 325-73 (3d ed. 1995) (explaining bivariate comparisons); R.
MARK SiRKIN, STATISTICS FOR THE SoCIAL SCIENCES 247-77, 345424 (1995) (same). In
measuring the prestige of colleges from which judges graduated, I used a system devised by
Alexander Astin and relied on by other researchers. See ALEXANDER W. AsTi, WHO GOES
WHERE TO COLLEGE? 57-83 (1965); Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, &x Race
and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmatve Action in Lm Facul, Hiring, 97 COLtwL L
REV. 199, 222 n.75 (1997) (discussing scholars' frequent reliance on Astin). A number of
studies have suggested that a college's prestige is related to the socio-economic status of its
students. See id at 230 n.101 (citing studies).
37. Multiple regression analyses control simultaneously for all independent variables in the
regression equation; they are more sophisticated in identifying relationships between dependent
and independent variables. See generally BuTroL'H JOHNSON & JOsLYt, supra note 36, at
389.401 (explaining multiple regression analyses); SIPYJN, supra note 36, at 446-67 (same). I
used a logistic regression to analyze the dichotomous dependent variable of whether a judge
voted for or against the union. The regression equation includes numerous independent
variables, but I have coded other types of judicial attributes and background factors. It is
possible that adding some of these other variables to the equation vill modify the findings
reported in text.
1998]
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support the hypothesis that in the ideologically divisive labor relations
area, certain personal, educational, and career experiences play an
important role in shaping judicial behavior."
In the end, some dissonance between statutory meaning and social
reality is inevitable. Legal rules do a better job of encouraging or
limiting individuals' conduct than of accurately reflecting the
experiences that comprise the conduct. Insofar as judicial departures
from social reality are especially acute and visible with regard to
decisions interpreting the NLRA, it is worth exploring possible reasons
linked to the attributes and attitudes of the judges involved. Efforts to
educate current and prospective judges are more likely to be effective
if premised on a fuller understanding of what motivates judicial
mistrust toward union and employee rights.
Such efforts in turn presuppose an attitude other than despair on
the part of those who purport to do the educating. It is possible to be
critical and even skeptical about the development of NLRA doctrine
while alerting law students to the possibilities for modification and
reform. When he taught me labor law some twenty years ago,
Professor Getman conveyed just that combination, as he has to many
others now engaged in teaching the subject. I hope he does not
abandon the approach he modeled with such success.
38. Such results also would diverge from recent studies that have found political party of
the judge or the appointing President to be the background variable with the most powerful
explanatory value. See AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND
BEHAVIOR 382 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 2d ed. 1989) (discussing several
studies); Aliotta, supra note 30, at 278 (same).
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